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You may fool all the people some of the time; you can
even fool some of the people all the time; but you
can’t fool all of the people all the time.
Abraham Lincoln
The Problem
Minnesota’s personal income tax is regressive for significant
numbers of people. Many Minnesotans would probably be surprised and
dismayed if made aware of this. The personal income tax is widely
described as progressive, and many people support it for this reason.
A structure of nominal tax rates which increase with rising incomes
contributes to the misperception that the tax is progressive. In
addition, the complexity of the tax law makes it difficult for citizens
to discover the actual, regressive tax rates implicit in the nominal
rates.
Deductibility of federal taxes in calculating Minnesota personal
income taxes is a major, although not the only, factor underlying these
problems. The deduction adds complexity, even requiring a separate
form in tax returns filed in 1982. The deduction forces nominal tax
rates to be considerably higher, especially for wealthier people, than
1 Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of
Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota 55108 and currently on leave as Senior
Staff Economist, Council of Economic Advisers, Washington, D.C. 20500.
The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily reflect the viewpoint of the Federal Government. The helpful
comments of Margaret Dewar, John Helmberger, Jack Paulson, Ann Wynia,
and Carole Yoho on an earlier draft are gratefully acknowledged.the rates necessary to yield
deduction of federal taxes.
-2-
equal revenue in the absence of
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$35,915. These high rates contribute to a perception of Minnesota
as a state with high taxes. High personal income taxes, in turn,
are popularly believed to have a negative impact on the business
2 climate although the analytic results are not clear cut. A more
accurate perception of state tax rates actually paid on income would
be a constructive development in the debate of Minnesota’s business
climate.
Finally and most importantly, deductibility of federal taxes
reduces the apparent progressivity of the Minnesota personal income
tax. The regressive features of the federal tax deduction overwhelm
the apparent progressivity of Minnesota tax rates for people with
high incomes. Partly for this reason, Minnesota is one of only sixteen
“z Roger J. Vaughan’s chapter on “What Should States Do About Personal
Taxes?” in his book State Taxation and Economic Development (Washington,
D.C.: Council of State Planning Agencies, 1979, pages 113-131) contains
a good characterization of the range and uncertainty of the findings.
The conclusion of another researcher, Roger W. Schmenner, may be relevant
to Minnesota (excerpted from “Location Decisions of Large Firms: Impli-
cations for Public Policy,” Commentary, VO1.5, No. 1, National Council
for Urban Economic Development, January 1981, pp. 3-7).
States and localities should avoid being “fiscally conspicuous.”
...Instead of levying a single conspicuous tax, states and local-
ities should levy many smaller taxes and charges that are difficult
to compare across sites. If a state can avoid being discarded
early on by a manager’s irrational look at some conspicuous tax,
it stands a better chance of being favorably reviewed by a company.-3-
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states allowlng the deduction of federal income taxes.
Objective
The objective of this paper is to develop alternative personal
income tax schedules which:
o eliminate the deduction of federal income
taxes, in order to reduce regressivity,
complexity, and misperception;
o hold state tax revenues at the levels
anticipated with current tax policies; and
o eliminate the regressivity of state rates
relative to Minnesota gross income.
The first and second conditions, considered together, imply that
the tax rates in the alternative schedules will be lower than those
in current schedules. The second and third conditions, considered
jointly, imply the alternative tax schedules will have a somewhat dif-
ferent pattern over income brackets than current effective tax rates.
Two alternative personal income tax schedules are developed in
order to reflect two different philosophies of appropriate taxation.
The “predominantly proportional” schedule embodies the view that most
taxpayers should pay income taxes which are proportional to their
income. The “predominantly progressive” schedule incorporates the
belief that higher income people should pay higher tax
out the paper, the terms regressive, proportional, and
rates. Through-
progressive rates
are used in the conventional sense as the rate on marginal
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regresslve, proportional, and progressive rates are respectively
defined as decreasing, constant, and increasing tax rates on successive
increments to income.
The current tax schedule and two alternatives are displayed in
Table 1. A substantial lowering of tax rates is possible with the
elimination of the deduction of federal taxes, while holding state
revenues approximately constant. The changes in state tax revenues
from the “current law” base of $2.0 billion to the “predominantly
progressive” alternatives are -$1 million (0.06%) and $8 million (0.4%),
respectively. Further refinement towards no change would be insig-
nificant for analytic or policy purposes.
Analytic Context
The calculations underlying the results presented in this paper
were performed on the Minnesota Tax Analysis Program maintained by the
Minnesota Department of Revenue. 4
This program utilizes a large sample
of actual returns in the analysis of tax policy and is widely regarded
as the best tool available for analyzing state income tax policy. The
program is utilized by people in the executive and legislative branches,
including members of both political parties. Thus, the program serves
as a useful common denominator which minimizes disputes over operational
4
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assumptions and focuses debate on pollcy issues.
The analysis is based upon estimates for 1983 Incomes reported
on returns to be filed m 1984, the first period during which policy
changes could be made. All federal and state tax laws scheduled to
be effective in 1983 as of this analysis (July 15, 1982) are included.
The analysis is a forward looking procedure rather than a retrospec-
tive look at “what would have happened” in a past year. The latter
tends not to be satisfactory in a time such as this when future tax
schedules are very different from those in effect pzior to 1982, due
to changes in state and federal legislation. All assumptions needed
to calculate 1983 taxes, such as rates of increase of income and price
levels, are the standard assumptions developed by the Department of
Finance.
Results
The problems of misperception and regressivity inherent in the
current law are shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4 (columns 3 and 4) for three
different households. The three examples represent diverse situations —
a married couple with two dependents, a married couple without dependents,
and a single person without dependents. The misperception of tax rates flows
from the large gap between the nominal rates given considerable publicity and
the actual rates paid. The gap is especially large for
Filers who are paying nominal rates of 14 to 16 percent




actual tax rates paid as households move from upper-middle to higher income
levels. Put differently, the maximum tax rates on additional income are paid
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households.s In the case of married couples filing Jointly, as shown
in Table 2, a couple with Minnesota gross income of $75,000 pays a
marginal tax rate equal to that paid by a couple with income of $13,000 --
and couples with incomes of $14,000 to $50,000 pay higher rates than the
couple with income of $75,000.
The tax data displayed in Tables 2, 3, and 4 for the predominantly
proportional and predominantly progressive alternatives indicate how
elimination of the deduction of federal taxes contributes to solving the
problems of misperception and regressivity. The gap between nominal
bracket rates and actual tax rates, measuring the latter relative to
Minnesota gross income, is considerably lessened. For those taxpayers
currently subJect to nominal bracket rates of 14-16 percent, the gap
between nominal and actual marginal rates falls from a range of 4-8
percent under current law to 1 to 2 percent under the alternatives.
The structure of the nominal schedule becomes an accurate indicator of
the actual tax rates borne by taxpayers with different incomes.
The extensive range of nominal proportional tax rates in the ‘“pre-
dominantly proportional” alternative is reflected in actual propor-
tional tax rates over the same range. The progressivity of the nominal
rates in the “predominantly progressive” alternative leads to a pattern
of progressivity in actual rates. These results are in stark contrast
to the current law, under which a system of progressive nominal
5 While this result may be surprising to those who focus on nominal
tax rates, the regressive impact of allowing deduction of federal taxes
at the state level is commonly recognized in public finance. For
example, see Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance
In Theory and Practice, third edition, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1980, pp.390-2.-11-
rates leads to a range of regressive actual rates.
Adoption of either of the alternative tax schedules presented here
would shift the tax burden among income categories, as shown in Table 5.
The predominantly proportional schedule, as structured here with an
initial progressive range for lower income taxpayers, tends to reduce
the taxes of lower income people and of higher income people while
raising the taxes of middle income people. The estimated number of
returns with an increased tax, assuming the predominantly proportional
alternative, approximately equals the number with a decreased tax. The
predominantly progressive schedule raises the taxes of higher income
people, as expected since the regressive range at the upper end is
eliminated. Lower and middle income taxpayers tend to pay lower taxes,
under the predominantly progressive alternative, as the revenue gener-
ated by the elimination of the regressive range is redistributed among
other taxpayers. The number of people who pay lower taxes is three times
the number who pay higher taxes, as a result of a shift to the predom-
inantly progressive schedule.
The estimated distribution among taxable income brackets of taxable
income and of filers with a tax llability for the two alternative sche-
dules is shown in Table 6. The proportional segment (i.e., the brackets
with a 9.4 percent tax rate) of the predominantly proportional schedule
includes 68 percent of tax returns and 56 percent of distributed taxable
income. The detail of the predominantly progressive schedule is best
seen by referring to the table rather than by repeating the data here in






















































































Elimination of the deduction of federal taxes and the simultaneous
reduction of state tax rates would
o enable elimination of the regressive features of the current
law without raising nominal tax rates for higher income tax-
payers,
reduce the complexity of the state personal income tax, and
narrow the gap between highly publicized nominal rates and
actual rates paid by lowering nominal rates, thus lessening
misperception and possibly improving the statels business
climate.